

Kiras differentiates irregular and regular warfare by the relative capabilities of the two sidesⁱ. Where these are radically different and the weaker side utilises political means and asymmetric methods, he classifies this as irregular warfare. I aim to demonstrate that the initially stronger side will have to make radical changes in command methods in order to be successful. Many of these aspects of COIN have no counterpart in conventional operations. I have concentrated on the post-1945 western model as command requirements evolve over time (some other examples are used to illuminate specific points however).

In many articles on COIN, Vietnam is cited. It is better regarded as an example of hybrid war (in a similar way that Russian partisans under Davidov in 1812 and the Great Patriotic War were) and therefore of limited relevance here.

Fall, an ex-resistance fighter himself came up with a mathematical model where:

$$\text{revolutionary warfare} = \text{guerrilla warfare} + \text{political activity}^{\text{ii}}$$

He goes on to emphasise that the killing (not just the enemy but of the insurgent's own nationality who are aiding them) is a minor part of counterinsurgency and will not result in a victory. Here lies the biggest difference, namely that defeating the enemy in the field is of secondary (or even tertiary) importance. Killing insurgents may even be counterproductive as each death creates ripples through the society that can create more guerrillas (assuming that the casualties inflicted are locals). In other words, Jominian doctrines replace Clausewitzian emphasising defeating the people not the army. If this is the case, how then is COIN command different?

Unlike conventional commanders, a COIN commander has to consider what can be regarded as victory. Conventional operations have a political aim to meet and even if this is not, political level decisions will decide a war is over. COIN operations instead are won by "establishing sufficient legitimacy to incorporate a critical mass of the population within the government camp."ⁱⁱⁱ Without a political settlement there will at best be a lingering level of support for another insurgency. Splinter groups may continue fighting long after the conflict officially ends and activity may flare up in the future. At what point does this become a victory? It is even possible to win militarily as the French did in Algeria but lose politically.

Linked to this, COIN is not concerned with taking and holding terrain. Commonly in the early days of Malaya commanders looked at a map and saw a red area (for a CT controlled area). They would then conduct a battalion sweep (which being large and slow would not achieve any significant results, the guerrillas melting away ahead of it). They would then mark the map as green (cleared of CTs).^{iv} Instead, COIN commanders must win the populace over, insurgents win by having not enough of the populace support the government to create Mao's ocean to swim in. It is notable in light of the failure of the US Army's hearts and minds campaigns in Vietnam that the US Army's training wargame written specifically for Vietnam devoted only half a page of 68 to civilians (and this just notes how likely the populace are to reveal enemy movements). Additionally, it does not consider the possibility to local force VC blending back into the population, they are treated as a conventional army.^v This insurgent control is often achieved through intimidation and assassination although executions can of course occur on both sides. Curry notes that government war crimes are not even remarked on in analysis of US wargames even though it is counterproductive as we shall see below.^{vi}

McChrystal explains that a unique issue for the COIN commander is considering the needs of the civilians they need to win over. Many oversimplify this to popularity contest levels, implying building schools, etc is enough to win over the population. McChrystal instead argues what is required is the people to be ACTIVELY on the side of the government.^{vii} Populations are generally ambivalent over

who is in government as long as their needs (especially security) are met. If the insurgents can threaten the population then they are unlikely to support the government. Alternatively, if they see that the insurgents can offer a better life e.g. by demonstrating a fairer legal system, the population will, covertly or overtly, turn against the government. It is significant in Pontecorvo's Battle of Algiers, that the first act of rebellion is a wedding conducted by the FLN, establishing them as the alternative government.^{viii}

It is worth noting that the American police have adopted similar techniques in Springfield, Mass^{ix}. This illustrates that COIN is really not a military task but instead a governmental function that may sometimes require military support.

Fall wrote, "everyone likes to fight the war they know best."^x Most armies primarily train for conventional not COIN operations.^{xi} Whenever we are not prepared, we default to learned instincts. Swinton used a series of dreams to explain how a conventionally minded commander would struggle against an enemy using unconventional tactics. He remarks he would have been happy fighting Waterloo, or Sedan, or Bull Run as this is what he had trained for.^{xii} As a result, commanders need to be ready to learn, especially as each insurgency is different. This needs to be genuine and not lip service to be effective. Nagal notes that the US Army Cooks and Bakers' School added classes on counterinsurgency when Kennedy asked the army to develop unconventional warfare abilities!^{xiii}

This historical approach can pay dividends, e.g. the US FM3-24 of 2007 resurrected interest in the forgotten Galula and T E Lawrence quoted Thucydides. Previous manuals may also be helpful, e.g. the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1935 (revised 1940) had been forgotten twenty years later to the extent that the author of a new pamphlet had never heard of it. That manual had in turn forgotten the lessons of the 1899-1913 Moro Rebellion. While conventionally orientated commanders can benefit from an understanding of historical precedents, a COIN commander will have much more scope to gain useful insights.

Calwell's ground-breaking systematic study of COIN broke insurgencies into six categories.^{xiv} Motives and methods change however and as a result previous solutions may not work e.g. the French post-war continued with successful pre-war models without realising that the nature of the insurgency had changed from piratical to ideological^{xv} and the way that Al-Qaida in Iraq changed from hierarchical to nodal structures requiring a targeting change^{xvi}. This evolution will often be far faster than in conventional warfare. Insurgent texts may also be of use, for example the first edition of Taber being bought by the US Army.^{xvii}

The COIN commander must understand who is the enemy, unlike a conventional commander facing uniformed enemies. Fall analysed some Vietnam War participants and came to the conclusion that "the communists...find out to their surprise that not all the peasants or workers are on their side. On the other hand, neither are all of the elite on ours."^{xviii}

One of the most important command roles is to portray the insurgents as criminals not freedom fighters. British doctrine is a prime example of this. The aim was always to act as "aid to the civil power," i.e. to only assist the police, helping maintain normality as any escalation gives the impression the insurgents are succeeding. As Nagal notes this reduces control and may mean that the best troops for a job are not utilised^{xix}. Pilmot adds the requirement for a good level of cooperation and political leaders who understand the utilisation of troops, citing the example of the Deputy Commissioner in Peshawar in 1930 who sent in unsupported armoured cars against mobs in an urban environment.^{xx}

It may be that the police are ineffective, this being one of the reasons that the insurgency has developed. COIN commanders may have to consider forming local auxiliaries. Pilmot notes was often British practice as it reduced costs and increased local self-sufficiency.^{xxi} In Kenya where local support was initially weak these were still effective and even in Rhodesia there was significant black voluntary recruitment into the security forces with conscription only needed after the formation of the transitional government.^{xxii} This use of auxiliaries has an added bonus that it shows the government trusts the local population, especially when they are from the same ethnic or religious group as the insurgents.

Using paramilitaries or allies can bring in new issues such as “collective action problems, inconsistent threat perceptions, free-riding, and an unwillingness to subjugate narrow national interests to the need for tight coordination.”^{xxiii} While these may be present in conventional operations, they are more significant and prominent in COIN e.g. German troops in Afghanistan were not allowed to patrol outside their bases at night for political reasons, giving insurgents the opportunity to move through this area safely.

COIN commanders can often forget to allow for the local troops, Hennessey, who commanded a mentoring team, notes that while there are large numbers of books written about coalition troops in Afghanistan, the role of the Afghans themselves has been ignored.^{xxiv}

Beyond the host country or coalition allies, Colibaba identifies other groups that may be involved such as the UN, relief agencies, PMCs and commercial contractors.^{xxv} As there is usually no formal war, even the commander’s own government may have other agencies with conflicting priorities. This committee command structure with civilian meddling has become more pronounced as communications technology increases. Thompson once remarked that despite many visits to Washington he was never really sure who was in charge of the Vietnam War.^{xxvi}

This improved communications technology also affected the COIN commander who will need to be media savvy and ensure that the presentation of the war is positive, far more than in conventional operations. While it has certainly helped the insurgent by giving them a way of presenting their ideas, it has also helped the COIN commander who can now communicate directly with the population. Black also points out that this winning of the media war is not just in the context of the theatre of operations.^{xxvii} While he is not specific as to where, this includes not just the nations supplying troops but also the region (or even the world’s) public opinion.

Thompson notes that the guerrilla may also have allies in a political front that is outwardly legitimate.^{xxviii} The COIN commander will also have to consider how these are dealt with, limiting their ability to win over the population without generating support by repressive measures.

Many COIN operations will take place in a foreign country and the military will often be seen as an occupying force. Donovan gives two personal examples of US troops abusing locals, one of whom was later found dead in an ambush, making him wonder if she had been a guerrilla before the abuse.^{xxix} This means that the COIN commander may well need to step back advising instead of leading. This can cause major problems if the government is inefficient or corrupt as illustrated by Sheehan which came to a head in the Battle of Ap Bac.^{xxx}

An aspect that may be hard to square for a commander is that the forces being supported are not democratic themselves. Here, if a commander is too supportive of the regime’s forces it is seen as propping up a government that the people do not support thus causing the COIN forces to be seen as an enemy. Similarly, if government forces do not follow the rule of law but instead terrorise the local population, it is then a case of guilt by association. A Russian journalist felt the Soviet

intervention in Afghanistan was actually counter-productive due to this and their cause would have been better served by providing support instead of troops^{xxx}.

Local culture awareness is an issue for commanders in COIN, commanders need to understand how the society functions and its nuances. This includes aspects like Iraqis being upset by search dogs as dogs are seen as unclean in their culture^{xxxii}. Beckett argues that the biggest error in American COIN operations is the assumption that exposure to American cultural values will result in assimilation of them^{xxxiii}. US doctrine has moved away from this^{xxxiv} and Nagal (who was one of the authors) goes further noting commanders should identify what is regarded as an acceptable level of corruption culturally and tolerate this. Even good intentioned plans may fail if not considered with local eyes, e.g. the Soviets initially deployed Muslim troops from the Soviet republics to Afghanistan thinking they would understand the culture better. Not considered was that the tribal and ethnic divisions actually made these less acceptable than Russian troops!

Nagal notes in his introduction to the second edition of his book (after serving in Iraq) that using locals alongside US troops allowed for much more effective operations.^{xxxv} Conventional operations rarely involve the integration of troops in this way (exceptions being the KATUSAs and the Commonwealth KATCOM equivalent in Korea). There can be issues as difficulty trusting (especially if using turned guerrillas), cultural differences and incompatible equipment and doctrine however.

Kiras emphasises that the winning of an insurgency takes years, even decades, noting the overthrow of Batista in almost perfect circumstances took three years^{xxxvi}. It follows that COIN activity will also be lengthy, especially as guerrillas can move back through Mao's three stages if unsuccessful. For a government to win against an insurgent it has to defeat them, while all insurgents only have to not lose. Commanders of COIN operations are often under time pressure to win quickly to minimise the cost (and by extension public opinion). A more subtle pressure is that the commander who does not achieve results will be seen as a failure and his career prospects damaged. There may be a pressure to create artificial results. Nagal notes the example of Lieutenant General Ewell in Vietnam who recorded very high body counts but very low ratios of captured weapons^{xxxvii}. The implication is that in order to achieve reportable success, the division would not worry about increased civilian casualties, something which is counterproductive.

Another problem is that the frustration of not finding the enemy may lead to troops taking the law into their own hands (e.g. the Bushveldt Carbineers made famous by Denton^{xxxviii} and My Lai). While occurring in all conflicts, abuse of prisoners or suspects will be especially counterproductive in COIN operations as it not only discourages surrender (as in conventional war) but also makes the cause less legitimate.

Identifying the enemy is a major problem as guerrillas generally do not wear uniform and carry their arms openly. COIN commanders will therefore have to consider how prisoners are treated. Even following a legal process and executing prisoners can create martyrs for the cause as happened after the Easter Rising, while holding them as criminals often allows urban guerrillas to take hostages to exchange for them. All insurgents will however have a policy to execute turncoats and informants as these are a major threat to their security. The IRA kneecapping technique severely limited people's willingness to give evidence – they also cleverly used the same technique on those undertaking anti-social activities such as drug dealing to help associate the act of "touting" with criminal acts. This winning people over is essential to both sides.

All commanders will look at the supply situation of the enemy, this is accentuated in COIN operations if the guerrillas are not well armed. Most guerrillas will not have extensive, formal supply

networks. They may rely on an external supply (the US and China supplying the Mujahadeen), use what is already available to them (the Malaysians using weapons left from fighting the Japanese) or captured from government forces (the Iraqi militias quickly took huge amounts from unsecured). Interdicting this supply is a major method to limit the guerrilla ability to operate (the British used numerous ways of limit food to the guerrillas including cooking it prior to distribution reducing the length of time it could be held before spoiling and even not allowing plantation workers to take lunch out of the towns to work).

The ability of the insurgent to cross borders does not just help them resupply, it also offers a sanctuary to regroup. Often tribal or ethnic groupings will cross boundaries making cross border activity the norm. These porous borders are not something a conventional commander concerned with regular troops has to consider. Thompson notes the difference that the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Mozambique and Angola made to ZANU and ZANLA in Rhodesia. In most cases the COIN commander will be unable to strike at these except covertly (although Grant details one of the few successful exceptions^{xxxix}). Instead it may be necessary to seal the border, something few militaries have trained for. This can take many forms from the French using the Morice Line in Algeria, through South African use of border bushmen to the American use of armed drones.

A COIN commander will often need to make political concessions to undermine the guerrilla's key aim. Insurgents will have a reason for revolting, identified by Thompson as being in five categories, social, political, economic, military and psychological.^{xl} The difficulty is concessions can only be done from a perceived position of strength, if it is done from a weak position then it will have the perception that the guerrillas are winning. The need to make concessions was even promoted by the leading Soviet theorist Tukhachevsky in 1926 who cynically stressed that there was a need for temporary political concessions alongside the authoritarian mass deportations and deployment of the Cheka when dealing with what for ideological reasons he referred to as "banditry."^{xli} The ability to actually use this approach will differ greatly by the insurgency, concessions to ISIS for example will be unlikely to win any supporters while the Mau-Mau had concessions as their overall aim.^{xlii} Sometimes there is even a requirement to undertake a military action to put on political pressure.^{xliii} This political aspect is completely missing in conventional operations.

Turning guerrillas and their sympathisers is something a COIN commander will have to consider. Identification is a high priority and Thompson gives a good example of how the British used caught food smugglers in Malaya to create informants.^{xliv} It is worth noting that even Tukhachevsky was willing to recommend that insurgents be given amnesty and even using ex-guerrillas in COIN operations.^{xlv} Greene in Malaya pushed for the option to turn insurgents arguing that if they only faced a death penalty the only way to defeat them was to kill them all^{xlvi}. The use of pseudo-guerrillas using turned troops was taken to extremes by the Rhodesians who used it that well paranoia was greatly increased in the guerrillas (it was so well organised that sometimes the COIN forces were more up to date on guerrilla procedures than some of the more isolated groups).^{xlvii}

So far we have concentrated on the western democracies, Black argues that these form a minority of cases^{xlviii}. Democracies now have to deal with public opinion. Byman argues that authoritarian governments do counterinsurgency incorrectly, slaughtering without winning hearts and minds but does accept they achieve the same success rates as democracies.^{xlix} The Russian approach does not recognise any difference between counterinsurgency and conventional warfare, e.g. assaults on insurgent towns are conventional assaults following artillery barrages^l. In Afghanistan, conventional tactics were heavily used as demonstrated by the Frunze Academy's lessons learned^{li}. Warfare is seen as a continuum with the use of any method acceptable. The Western avoiding of collateral

damage is conspicuously absent. Given this I have largely ignored the authoritarian method of COIN as it is no different to conventional warfare.

Overall, just as the tactics used in one war will differ from those of another, those required in one counter-insurgency will differ from another. While all military operations and the command aspects will have similarities (even while conducting operations such as disaster relief), COIN commanders will need to develop very different skill sets from those they have trained for, emphasising slow and steady progress in winning over a population instead of swift decisive action against an identifiable enemy. As a result, the emphasis and requirements of the command role will be redefined and often a competent conventional commander will be found lacking just as those who are good at operating in a COIN role often make poor conventional commanders.

ⁱ James D Kiras, "Chapter 9: Terrorism and Irregular Warfare," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (S.I.: Oxford University Press, 2002), 208-232

ⁱⁱ Bernard B Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Naval War College Review* 18, no. 3 (April 1965): 21-38, 22.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), ix.

^{iv} John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

^v Research Analysis Corporation, *Tacspiel: The American Army's Wargaming Rules for the Vietnam War (1966)*, ed. John Curry and Peter Perla, 2nd ed. (History of Wargaming Project, 2020).

^{vi} Abt Associates, *The Pentagon's Rural AGILE/COIN Wargame (1966)*, ed. John Armatys and John Curry (History of Wargaming Project, 2022), 2-3.

^{vii} Stanley McChrystal, "8 Imperatives of Coin," YouTube (YouTube, April 5, 2010), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ec3L6Y5MyKQ>.

^{viii} *The Battle of Algiers* (Allied Artists Corporation, 1969).

^{ix} CBSNewsOnline, "Counterinsurgency Cops: Military Tactics Fight Street Crime," YouTube (YouTube, May 5, 2013), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8Ls3YSulCw>.

^x Bernard B Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Naval War College Review* 18, no. 3 (April 1965): 21-38, 28.

^{xixi} Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).

^{xii} E D Swinton in John Curry, ed., *Army Wargames: Two Centuries of Staff College Exercises*, 2nd ed. (History of Wargaming Project, 2016), 43-89.

^{xiii} John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 125.

^{xiv} C E Callwell, *Small Wars*, Kindle (Tales End Press, 2012).

^{xv} Frances Toase In Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 58.

^{xvi} "Retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal on Organizing to Fight and Win in a Complex World," YouTube (YouTube, June 22, 2017), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXKJLBkRBFM>.

^{xvii} Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 7.

^{xviii} Bernard B Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Naval War College Review* 18, no. 3 (April 1965): 21-38, 22-23.

^{xix} John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

^{xx} In Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 18-19.

^{xxi} In Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 20-21.

- ^{xxii} Ian F W Beckett, *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 183.
- ^{xxiii} Jens Ringsmose and Peter Dahl Thruelsen, "NATO'S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN: ARE CLASSICAL DOCTRINES SUITABLE FOR ALLIANCES?" (Madrid, Spain: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2010), 56-77.
- ^{xxiv} Patrick Hennessey, *Kandak: Fighting with Afghans* (London: Penguin Books, 2013), 7-11
- ^{xxv} Christinel Colibaba, "Expanding the Role of a Company Commander in a COIN Environment." Quantico: USMC Command and Staff College, February 19, 2008.
- ^{xxvi} Peter Dunn in Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 83.
- ^{xxvii} Jeremy Black, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency a Global History*, Audiobook (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), Chapter 1.
- ^{xxviii} Leroy Thompson, *Counter-Insurgency Manual* (London: Frontline Books, 2015), 23-24
- ^{xxix} Donald Donovan, *Once a Warrior King: Memoirs of an Officer in Vietnam* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985), 42-47
- ^{xxx} Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House, Inc., 2013)
- ^{xxxi} Robert F Bauerman, "Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan," 20 *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan* § (1993), 177.
- ^{xxxii} Ben Barry, *Blood, Metal and Dust: How Victory Turned into Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq*, Audiobook (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021).
- ^{xxxiii} In Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 111
- ^{xxxiv} David Howell Petraeus and James F. Amos, *Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24 (2006)* (Boulder, CO: Paladin, 2006).
- ^{xxxv} John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2009), xiv-xv.
- ^{xxxvi} James D Kiras, "Chapter 9: Terrorism and Irregular Warfare," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (S.I.: Oxford University Press, 2002), 208-232, 213-214.
- ^{xxxvii} John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 172.
- ^{xxxviii} Kit Denton, *The Breaker* (Melbourne: Bolinda Audio, 2008).
- ^{xxxix} Neil Grant and Peter Dennis, *Rhodesian Light Infantryman, 1961-80*, vol. 177 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2015), 42-47.
- ^{xl} Leroy Thompson, *Counter-Insurgency Manual* (London: Frontline Books, 2015), 11-14.
- ^{xli} Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 11, 84-85
- ^{xlii} Abiodun Alao and Christa Hook, *Mau-Mau Warrior*, vol. 108 (Oxford: Osprey, 2006), 9-10.
- ^{xliii} Such as the Rhodesian Operation Miracle quoted by Beckett in Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 166
- ^{xliiv} Leroy Thompson, *Counter-Insurgency Manual* (London: Frontline Books, 2015), 57
- ^{xli v} Ian Beckett in Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History*, 2nd ed. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 11, 100-101
- ^{xli vi} John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2009) 93
- ^{xli vii} Leroy Thompson, *Counter-Insurgency Manual* (London: Frontline Books, 2015)
- ^{xli viii} Jeremy Black, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency a Global History*, Audiobook (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), Chapter 1.
- ^{xli x} Daniel Byman, "'Death Solves All Problems': The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 1 (September 14, 2015): pp. 62-93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1068166>.

^l Dodge Billingsley, *Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars, 1994-2009* (Solihull: Helion & Company Ltd, 2013) gives a good account of the Russian conventional counter-tactics.

^{li} Lester W Grau, tran., *The Bear Went Over the Mountain*, Kindle (Tales End Press, 2012).

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